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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by virtue of the
Appellant's appeal from a judgment entered in Civil Action No.
8329 in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Millard
County and the assignment of the case to this court by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting
plaintiff judgment for $14,374.77 for the overpayment on a written
contract and denying defendant relief on defendant's counterclaim
for damages for breach of the same contract.
Appellant makes two points, each one apparently asserting
that the evidence presented did not support the trial court's
decision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's "Statement of the Case" contains inaccuracies
which require plaintiff to make its statement of the case.
In 1986 the plaintiff, Marco Industrial Supply, Inc. (Marco)
was in the business of buying scrap material in the United States
for resale to a company in Taiwan, Chog Din Snt. Co., L.T.D.
In September of 1986, Marco's representative, Marc Chien,
(Chien) learned that the defendant, Richard M. Swain, (Swain), a
Utah resident, had been the successful bidder for a quantity of
salvage metal which was located at a United States' facility, the

Mercury Test Site, in the State of Nevada.

(Tr. 5 ) .

A meeting was arranged at Las Vegas, Nevada at which meeting
Chien observed samples furnished by Swain of the kinds of
materials located at the Test Site.

(Tr. 6 ) .

Later, on September 8, 1986, Chien travelled to Fillmore to
visit Swain's yard.
While at Swain's yard, Chien inspected salvage material and
signed a handwritten agreement prepared by Swain which affected
materials at the Nevada Test Site and materials at Swain's yard
near Fillmore.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Tr. 14).

The terms of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 provided that Marco would
purchase approximately 750,000 pounds of
"aluminum coaxial and copper located at Mercury Test
Site $.21 per pound delivered to Long Beach. Also
included is material at Swain's property in Utah."
The writing, Exhibit A, listed types of salvage located at
Swain's yard, fixed the prices for each type of material but did
not describe a quantity to be purchased.

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit

1).
Materials were purchased by Marco and were shipped from
Nevada and Utah to Tawain in large metal containers which were
about 40 feet in length.
shipped.
Fillmore.

By October 28, 29 containers had been

Twenty-four were shipped from Nevada, five from
The 25 containers shipped from Nevada contained

materials which totaled 737,000 pounds.
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Marco paid Swain when

Marco was advised by telephone by Swain that the materials had
been shipped.

A total of $210,052.00 was paid which exceeded by

$14,374.77 the agreed prices of the material delivered.
of the overpayment was not disputed.

The fact

(Tr. 100).

Chien testified that when the shipped materials arrived in
Taiwan they were not as had been agreed.

He testified that 30 to

40 percent of the materials were not as agreed.

(Tr. 18). As

recited above, the materials had been paid for when Swain gave
notice that they had been shipped.

(Tr. 14, 15). Marco notified

Swain of the claimed discrepancy between the goods purchased and
those received.

Two meetings were held at Las Vegas to attempt to

negotiate a settlement over the claimed deficiency.
settlement negotiations were unsuccessful.

The

Marco then sued to

recover its excess payments and Swain counterclaimed claiming
damages for the breach by Marco of the terms of Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1.
The essence of Swain's appeal is two-fold.

The first claim

is that Marco agreed to purchase all of the materials of the kinds
listed on Exhibit 1 which were located at the Fillmore yard and
did not do so.

The second claim is that Marco agreed to purchase

all of the materials which Swain had purchased at the Mercury Test
Site and that Marco did not do so.

Swain claims that the figure

750,000 was intended as an approximation of all the materials at
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the Test Site which Swain claims Marco had agreed to purchase, not
an approximate amount of material which Marco was required to
purchase.

The trial court found that the written agreement

(plaintiff's Exhibit 1) was written by Swain and should be most
strongly construed against him.

The court held that Marco was not

obligated to take more materials than it had purchased.

The court

further held that Swain's evidence did not establish that he,
Swain, had been damaged.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT
THERE WAS NO INDENTIPICATION TO THE CONTRACT OF ANY
GIVEN QUANTITY OF MATERIALS OF THE FILLMORE YARD
In Swain's "Summary of Argument", paragraph 1 at page 6 of
his brief, he makes two claims.

The first is that

Marco did not take all the material he agreed to take; and
where Swain presented competent evidence showing he suffered
damages far in excess of the advance payment, which evidence
was not disputed in any manner by Marco.
Both of those statements are incorrect.
were called.

Only two witnesses

On the critical issues the trial court chose to

believe Chien rather than Swain.
The trial court held in Finding of Fact Number 6 that Marco
did not agree to purchase all of the material at Swain's yard:
No quantity of material at the Utah site was ever
specified, but plaintiff estimated the pile of scrap viewed
by the parties contained approximately 5 containers;
defendant estimates that such pile contained 12 to 14
containers.
4

(Record 100, 107).
A glance at Exhibit 1 will confirm that it does not specify a
quantity.
Swain.

The contract, plaintiff's Exhibit 1, was written by

The court ruled that its terms should be construed against

him and in favor of Marco.

The contract did not specify a

quantity and the trial court was not persuaded that Marco had
agreed to purchase all material located at Swain's yard.
In Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 492 P.Id 132, 27
Utah 2d (1971) the court stated:
Where appellant's position is that trial court erred in
refusing to make certain findings essential to its right to
recover, and it insists that the evidence compels such
findings, it is obligated to show that there is credible and
uncontradicted evidence which proves those contended facts
with such certainty that all reasonable minds must so find;
conversely if there is any reasonable basis, either in the
evidence or from the lack of evidence, upon which reasonable
minds might conclude that they are not so convinced by a
preponderance of the evidence, then the findings should not
be overturned.
To the same effect is Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah
1974):
Actions of trial court are indulged with a presumption of
validity, and burden is upon appellant to prove such serious
inequity as to manifest clear abuse of discretion.
See also R. C. Tolman Const. Co., Inc. v. Myton Water Assn.,
563 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976) and Leon Glazier & Sons, Inc. v. Larsen,
491 P.2d 226, 26 Utah 2d 429 (1971).
See also Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988),
where the court stated:

"When examining court's findings of fact,
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reviewing court defers to those findings unless they are clearly
erroneous."
At page 100 of the transcript, Chien testified that on
September 8, 1986 he estimated that Swain's yard contained about
five containers of materials,

Swain testified that the yard

contained between 12 and 14 containers of material.

(Tr. 107).

No evidence was presented with respect to any inventory records as
of September, 1986.

No business records were produced which would

have enabled the trial court to find the quantity of material
located at Swain's yard on September 8. 1986.

The only evidence

was the estimate of Swain and the estimate of Chien.

In addition

to the fact that there was no competent evidence as to the
quantity of material present in September, the court properly
found the plaintiff's Exhibit 1 did not specify any quantity of
goods to be purchased.
POINT II
MARCO SATISFIED THE QUANTITY REQUIREMENT OF THE
CONTRACT.
The trial court held that since plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was
written by Swain that it should be construed against Swain and in
favor of Marco.

(Conclusions of Law No. 1, Record 119).

The purchase of 737,000 pounds of materials satisfied Marco's
obligation to purchase approximately 750,000 pounds of goods.
Marco purchased more than 98% of the quantity of aluminum and
copper coaxial cable specified by plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
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The court's finding that the purchase of 737,000 pounds
satisfied the contract requirement is well supported by the
authorities.
The case of Holland v. Rea, 43 Mich. 218, 12 N.W. 167 (1982)
held that delivery of 473,000 of an agreed 500,000 feet of logs
amounted to substantial performance.

See also, in Polhemer v.

Herman, 45 Cal. 573 (1873), a delivery of 47,315 pounds of wool
was held a sufficient compliance with a contract requiring the
delivery of "about" 53,000 pounds.

In this case, Marco purchased

737,000 out of 750,000 pounds specified.

Certainly purchase of

.9816% of approximately 750,000 represents compliance with the
contract terms.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT SWAIN DID NOT SUPPORT
HIS DAMAGES CLAIM BY A PREPONDERANCE OF CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE.
At trial, Swain did not produce any records showing the
amount of goods he had in inventory on hand at any time. He
produced no written records to show purchases of goods, no records
of quantities of inventory on hand at any particular time nor any
records of sales.
It appears that Swain operated his business strictly on a
cash basis and kept no written records reflecting his business
activities.

There wasn't any evidence other than Swain's oral

testimony to support Swain's claim as to the quantity of goods
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located at the Mercury Test Site nor at Fillmore or whether the
material had been sold, and if sold, at what price.
Swain sought to prove his damages solely by oral testimony
regarding the quantities and kinds of goods not purchased by
Marco.

He sought to testify about the sales price and the

quantities of each kind of goods sold.
At the trial, Judge Christensen sustained objections to
Swain's oral testimony as to the quantities of materials sold by
Swain which Swain agreed that Marco had agreed to purchase.

The

court also denied admission to Swain's testimony concerning the
sales price of the materials which Swain said that Marco did not
purchase.

When Swain sought to testify, counsel for plaintiff

objected that the offerred testimony was not the best evidence.
The objection was sustained.

(Tr. 135).

A better objection would have been that the evidence was not
relevant by reason of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The court was concerned (Tr. 135) that Swain sought to prove
his damages by his oral testimony and that he did not offer any
business records or other evidence to support his parol
testimony.

The court referred to figures being pulled out of the

air to support Swain's claim.

(Tr. 135)

The court was not

satisfied with Swain's testimony concerning Swain's claimed
damages absent any business records to support his testimony.
At Swain's request, the judge granted Swain a five day period
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to supplement the record with written records evidencing the
quantities and prices of sales to which Swain testified.
140).

No such records were ever produced.

(Tr.

Instead, Swain offered

an affidavit and a hand written summary saying essentially the
same things to which he had testified at trial.

(R. 21-25).

No

business records were produced.
The only evidence furnished by Swain as to the quantities,
kinds of goods or prices at which the salvage materials were sold
was his parol testimony and an affidavit signed by him.

No

supporting documentary evidence of any kind was furnished.

In the

absence of any written evidence of records of purchase, sale or
ownership of the goods to which Swain testified, it was clearly
within the discretion of the court to find that the evidence
offered in support of Swain's claim did not satisfy his burden of
proof.
CONCLUSION
On disputed evidence, the trial court found that plaintiff
was entitled to judgment for the sum of $14,374.77 by reason of an
undisputed payment for goods not received.
On disputed evidence the court found that defendant and
counterclaimant had not proved breach of contract nor damages.
The record shows credible competent evidence to support the
trial court's findings, and a lack of credible evidence to support
defendant's defense or his counterclaim.
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The trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
Dated this

/,

day of April, 1989.

/ / A W&*

DALLAS H. Y O J J N G /
IVIE & YOUNG
/
Attorneys for Plaintiff

10

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of the
fa

Respondent to the following on this

day of April, 1989.

DEXTER L. ANDERSON
S. R. Box 52
Fillmore, UT 84631
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

DALLAS H. YOU

11

&U*y

